Increasing health care costs and long waiting times for public care are growing sources of concern for governments in industrialized countries. In this paper, we investigate the impact of waiting times on the demand for care, ask whether allowing congestion to increase in order to contain ever growing health care costs is socially desirable, and predict the expected outcome of policies aiming at the reduction of congestion and costs of care. We develop a macroeconomic model in which agents who dier in terms of age, health capital and wealth choose whether or not to use a public health care system funded through income taxes. Calibrating our model with Quebec data, we nd that the aggregate demand for care is quite inelastic with respect to health care congestion. Waiting times for care thus constitute a weak rationing device and should not be used by welfare-maximizing governments to contain costs. On the brighter side, policy simulations reveal that a 50% permanent reduction in Quebec waiting times can be achieved through a variety of scal measures that only moderately increase health care costs. While the choice of reform has important repercussions on the equilibrium, all such policies result in major welfare gains, with agents willing to sacrice over 5% of their post-policy consumption to leave the existing status quo. 1 of 8.6% in 20078.6% in (OECD, 2010. While the causes underlying this trend may vary from country to country, it has become a growing source of concern for governments. The public provision of care is a common feature in industrialized nations, with the government of all countries except the United
Introduction
Western countries have seen a constant growth of their health care spending over the last half and a number of other studies. Despite these eorts, our understanding of the relationship between congestion, demand for care and costs in public health care systems remains limited and many fundamental questions remain unanswered: Is it desirable to allow waiting times to increase in order to contain ever growing costs of care? Which patients are more likely to be discouraged from using health care as the congestion of the health care system increases? If both the cost and the congestion of care are high, what type of policy is most benecial to social welfare and economic activity? To answer these questions, we rst develop a theoretical model of health care demand in a public setting characterized by waiting times and zero monetary prices. We then add a macroeconomic equilibrium calibrated with Quebec data in order to quantitavely study the impact of waiting times on consumer demand and predict the expected outcome and desirability of policies aiming at the reduction of congestion and costs of care.
Our paper departs from and adds to the existing literature in three major ways. First, we introduce a health-capital demand model in a dynamic stochastic context that captures key features of public systems. This closes an important gap in the literature. While dynamic health-capital models originated in the 1970's (Grossman, 1972) and have addressed a variety of important questions, the literature has exclusively assumed that health markets were competitive and cleared with monetary prices. This is also the case with the more recent and growing literature which applies numerical methods to estimate the demand for care (Picone, Uribe and Wilson, 1998) Medicare are being pursued by the Obama administration.
Second, our methodology addresses limitations of the empirical literature on waiting times, which has so far been constrained to the study of waiting lists for specic procedures, such as cataract surgery, hip replacement, and hysterectomy, or groups of similar treatments (Coyte et al., 1994;  Anderson, 1997; Martin and Smith, 1999; Martin and Smith, 2003; Siciliani and Hurst, 2004) . The interest in these particular procedures is understandable: since they are elective in nature, they generate the longest waiting lists and are thus a natural source of public concern. However, two mains issues can be raised with such studies. A rst issue is that elective surgeries are a limited subset of the quantity of services provided by health care systems, and agents eligible for them are usually similar in terms of age and health. Consequently, these studies are not informative about the general congestion of the system. A second issue concerns the distinction, raised by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) , between waiting queues, where agents must wait in person at a given location, and waiting lists, where agents can use their time freely until receiving the desired good or service in the future. As rationing devices, the latter clear markets through a decrease in the present value of the desired good or service, while the former impose a direct opportunity cost on agents, who are unable to use this time for other purposes. Anecdotal evidence and intuition suggest that waiting time spent in crowded rooms before obtaining care (or being added to a list) is an important component of public care congestion and, plausibly, its most direct rationing mechanism. Some evidence from the medical literature also supports this notion. For instance, a 1990 survey revealed that the number of patients who left Los Angeles County emergency departments without being seen was correlated both with reported waiting times (in queues) and the public nature of facilities (Stock et al., 1994 ). 7.3% of public hospital patients left without being seen, versus only 2.4% of private hospital patients. Despite this, queues have largely been ignored by the empirical literature.
Again, this is understandable, since data on the duration of waiting lists abound, while data on the amount of time between the arrival at a care facility and entry into the waiting list are quite scarce.
Both of these issues are addressed with our approach. We model congestion as reducing the time available for agents to allocate between leisure and consumption, and assess the demand of agents of all age and health proles in face of the global congestion of care.
Third, because of our macroeconomic equilibrium, we take into account general equilibrium eects such as the reaction of workers to diering taxation mechanisms or congestion levels, and are able to predict the welfare impact of policies.
In our theoretical demand model, we study agents who dier in terms of age, health and nancial assets. The depreciation of health capital and the impact of care on health are modeled as stochastic variables that depend on the age and health of agents. Death is modeled as a terminal value that arises when a critically low value of health capital is reached. At any date, agents maximize their discounted lifetime utility by choosing their consumption, working time and whether or not to use the health care system. During a given period, the amount of time available for production and leisure is limited by the health of agents and, if they use health care, the congestion of the public system. In this model, we nd that agents choose to consume health care when the uncertain expected gain of doing so exceeds the certain utility cost endured in the current period, which is directly determined by the congestion of care. The global demand for public care is modeled as the sum of all agents who choose to consume health care, weighted by the unit cost of their health level.
Equilibrium arises when congestion is such that the global demand equals the public funds available for health care, obtained from taxes collected from the population of agents.
We devise a calibration strategy that assigns the congestion level, tax rate, and the health law of motion in order to replicate observed health care use, GDP, health care costs, mortality rates and life expectancy. We calibrate our model using Quebec data from the 2005 Canadian Community
Health Survey (CCHS). Quebec's case is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, health care expenses represented 11.3% (CIHI, 2008) of its GDP in 2007, which would have placed second behind the United States of America among OECD ratios (had it been a country). Second, indicators and anecdotal evidence suggest that Quebec's health care system has a high congestion. Of the 12% of Quebecers who claimed not to receive the appropriate amount of care in 2005 in the CCHS survey, 47% asserted that waiting times were to blame. As such, Quebec is a natural candidate for public reforms to its health care system both to reduce costs and combat the congestion of care.
Using our calibration as a starting point, we simulate the impact on demand of exogenous congestion levels to study elasticity with respect to waiting times, then simulate a quantity of policies by modifying the parameters under the government's control, such as the income tax rate and the generosity of the pension system. Our main ndings are that demand (as measured by the number of patients) is inelastic with respect to waiting times, with a simulated elasticity of -0.19 in the neighborhood of the present congestion level. In other words, a 1% increase in waiting times should be expected to reduce the number of users of health care by only 0.2%. When congestion emerges, young, healthy agents are the ones chased away from the system, while agents who stand to benet the most from health care remain. Since agents with lower health are most expensive to treat, the cost of public care is only marginally reduced by the exit of healthy agents. Thus, congestion is a weak device for containing health-related expenses.
Policy simulations indicate that reducing health care funding, which increases congestion, creates large welfare losses as measured by a variety of welfare measures, including the average value of our distribution of agents. The results indicate that a 1% reduction in the tax-to-GDP ratio of Quebec at the expense of health care would create a 260% permanent increase in waiting times, decreasing the welfare of all age and health groups. In contrast, introducing user fees, increasing income tax or decreasing the generosity of other government programs achieve a similar permanent reduction of congestion (via the increased funding of health care) and lead to important welfare gains. However, the outcome diers depending on the choice of policy. For instance, raising income taxes induces the largest increase in the number of users as it incorporates no replacement to waiting times as a disencentive to using health care. As a result, health care spending need to grow more as a percentage of GDP to reduce waiting times than is the case with the introduction of user fees. That said, applying high fees is found to decrease the welfare of the poorest and sickest agents, who prefer the status quo. Alternatively, increasing the retirement age by ve years produces a large GDP increase and a reduction in the cost of pensions but may be dicult to implement in practice, since
Quebecers have planned their life-cycle savings according to the existing scheme. We nd that a milder combination of these policies also yields a permanent decrease in congestion and moderates the undesirable aspects of individual policies; it may thus be the most attractive and politically feasible policy scenario.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical demand model. Section 3 develops the equilibrium concept and calibration strategy needed to solve our model numerically. Section 4 presents the calibrated demand function and our simulations of exogenous congestion levels and policies. Finally, Section 5 puts our results in a practical policy perspective and suggests future avenues of research.
Demand Model
To describe the consumer problem in a public health care setting, we use a discrete dynamic programming approach. The fundamental basis of our demand model is that health care usage is represented as the binary choice α , i.e. whether to use (α = 1) or not use (α = 0) the health care system at a given date. While this discrete-choice approach diers from the literature, the rationale is that the quantity of health care received by a patient is not restricted by the costs of treatment in a public system. Therefore, an individual that has chosen to seek care will usually rely on his physician's diagnosis and accept the treatment chosen for him. As such, the level of health care treatment received is irrelevant as a control variable in a public system. Also, the user faces a non-monetary cost associated to the waiting times for health care services. The time spent waiting in queues at diverse stages of health care production cannot be used for leisure or production by agents, and is thus a direct opportunity cost on his utility. To our knowledge, this cost has not yet been modeled in a dynamic health-capital model and constitutes the second major addition of this article to existing literature.
Our model's main concepts and notation draw from Grossman (1972) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) . At the beginning of a given period, the agent chooses his working time, savings and health care use in order to maximize his expected innite-horizon discounted utility:
where β is the discounting factor and c t and L t are the consumption and leisure in good health during the period t. Health does not directly enter the utility function and therefore does not contribute to the quality of consumption and leisure. As will be made clear shortly, our conception of time is such that health determines the quantity of time available to the agent, which in practice realizes the same eect. We restrict the utility arguments to consumption and leisure to avoid redundancy.
During a given period, the agent faces a certain amount LT (H, αγ) of lost time, in which H is his health and γ the congestion level of the health care system. Lost time can either be understood as the literal loss of time due to waiting for health care in a congested facility, or as a reection of lower quality of time due to the agent being ill, and thus unable to work as productively or enjoy leisure as fully as in full health. In either case, lost time is unavailable for production or leisure during a given period.
2 Accordingly, LT is decreasing in its rst argument, the agent's health level H, meaning that an agent in perfect health faces no lost time, while an agent nearing death loses a much greater portion of the period. If the agent chooses α = 1, the second argument is equal to γ, the congestion of the health care system. LT is strictly increasing in this argument, which means that seeking care bears a cost in time for the agent, and that this cost is increasing in the congestion of the public system. What is left of the period, the agent's available time can be freely divided between working time W T and leisure L. Thus, a P -length period is divided as follows:
2 French (2005) uses a similar interpretation of intra-period time distribution.
In eect, the agent's decision regarding time at a given date is limited to his use of health care α and his working time, which jointly determine the remaining leisure time.
The agent's productivity w is considered exogenous to his choices and state variables, and work income is taxed at rate τ in order to fund the public expenses. In addition to his work income, the agent can choose to consume some of his savings A in any period. The amount of savings will not be permitted to be below 0 at any time. For agents in the workforce, it follows that the constraint on consumption c is:
Since, in this paper, we model agents as self-employed, we reduce private pension plans to the choice of savings made by agents during their lifetime: what is left of their savings at the time of their retirement can then be used for consumption, in addition to a xed exogenous public pension. Accordingly, we model retirement as the following consumption constraint when agents reach the exogenous retirement age a θ :
where θ is the annual public transfer received by retired agents. 3 Applying this constraint, we know that agents will optimally choose W T = 0 when they reach age a θ if we consider a utility function strictly increasing in both consumption and leisure.
Like Grossman, we consider that death occurs when health level H falls below a critical H level, after which the agent receives a certain value of death V . To enforce life to be desirable over death as a basic rule for the remainder of this paper, we assign
For utility functions that are strictly increasing and continuous in both consumption and leisure, this formulation reaches that eect, the value of death being then equal to an innite sequence of periods in which the agent neither consumes nor enjoys leisure. 4 With respect to equations (1) to (5), the agent's maximization problem can be written as the following Bellman equation:
It is noteworthy that (6) does not contain the congestion level γ or the tax rate τ as state variables. While they play an active role in the optimization problem, the former is determined by the collective choices of the distribution of agents and the latter is set by the government. By assumption, individual agents cannot aect these parameters or predict their future variations. They are thus considered xed in the optimization problem. In section 3, we will see how these parameters are determined in the numerical version of the model.
The laws of motion for the agent's three state variables are as follows. First, the agent's stock of health-capital decreases at an uncertain depreciation rate δ each year, and may also be aected by the healthcare impact of treatment ψif he chooses to seek care. We formulate that the mean of the depreciation rate δ (a, δ ) is age-dependent and aected by a stochastic shock, δ . Therefore, the agent cannot predict or choose his age of death. This formulation allows for appreciations of health without using health care, which happen when δ is negative. If the agent chooses to use health care, he will add ψ (H, ψ ) to his health. The expected impact of treatment is dependent on the health level of the patient, though the sign of this relationship is debatable. 5 As with δ, the 4 It is worth noting that a variety of common utility functions, among which the Cobb-Douglas, imply u (0, 0) = 0, and thus yield V = 0, a seemingly intuitive level for the value of death. However, if the utility function allows for negative values, choosing V = 0 by default may result in some agents optimally avoiding health care to precipitate death.
5 As discussed by Chang (1995) , on the one hand, it could be easier to treat a patient with a single illness rather than one with multiple illnesses. In this case, the impact of care should be increasing in the level of health. On the other hand, a patient that is suering from a severe disease, and thus is in very bad health, could receive a greater appreciation of his health capital by having access to care than a patient with a mild disease. In this scenario, the impact of care should be greater with the level of sickness. To our knowledge, no stylized fact currently exists to success of health care in improving the agent's health is an uncertain phenomenon and depends on the realization of shock ψ . Finally, an agent whose health has fallen below the death threshold remains deceased in the next period. The movement of the agent's health-capital stock is given by:
Second, the amount of savings in the next period is the total amount of money available to the agent during the period that is not spent on consumption, increased by the real interest rate r:
Finally, at the end of each period, the agent's age a increases by one:
This constitutes the basic health care demand model used in this paper. 
This inequality can be interpreted as follows: in a public health care system characterized by waiting times, an agent will choose to use care if the expected dynamic gain of doing so, on the left-hand side, is larger than the utility loss in the current period, on the right-hand side. In this formulation, the gain of using health care is uncertain and set in the future, while the cost is immediate and certain.
In Appendix A, we further the analytic development of the demand model: we explore both sides of (10) in further detail, clarify the impact of the stochastic terms on death, and nd that waiting times are the most plausible and direct lever available to the government to restrict over-consumption of determine which of these equally plausible interpretations should be retained.
health care. Most interestingly, our analytical development enables us to decompose the expected dynamic gain of health care in two components. Denoting p α the probability of being alive in the next period conditional on the choice of α, we nd:
The rst component of (11) is the expected gain caused by the dierence in probability of being alive in the next period due to the use of health care. When a patient faces a life-threatening illness that can be addressed with a medical treatment, this component will have a high value. We thus name this component the life-saving gain. 6 The second component is the dierence in the expected value of life in t + 1 conditional to the agent being alive. This component will be high in cases where the use of health care increases both the agent's quantity of available time in subsequent periods and his expected longevity excluding the very next period. As mentioned above, an increase in available time can be interpreted as both an increase in the quality of the agent's time or its literal quantity.
We name to this component as the quality of life gain. More discussion on these components is presented in Appendix A.
Equilibrium and Calibration
In the remainder of the paper, we aim at numerically answering our research questions, which requires calibrating the model as closely as possible to available data and aggregating the choice of agents to predict the macroeconomic outcome of policies.
Calibrating our model presents two main challenges. First, although there is considerable evidence of congestion in Quebec's health care system, there is to our knowledge no single indicator that can be used to eectively calibrate the congestion of the whole system, γ. Waiting times for specic procedures or at the emergency room level, though somewhat informative, are not satisfying measures of congestion, since γ should reect the congestion of all services oered by the public health care system. Second, the health law of motion (7), while intuitive, is unobservable. The parameters chosen for this function should replicate some observable data, but a strategy is needed 6 We refrain from naming this component the life-expectancy gain because the impact of the use of health care in t on the probability of being alive in t + n, n > 1, periods, which also aects the dierence in life expectancy, is found in the second component. to achieve this goal.
Both to obtain a satisfying calibration and the macroeconomic outcome of policies, we add a macroeconomic equilibrium to our basic model. To that eect, we develop a health care supply and a pension system, both funded by income taxes. 7 We then specify the model's functional forms, basing ourselves on the literature when possible and on a minimal set of intuitions otherwise. Subsequently, we obtain the equilibrium for a distribution of agents consistent with Quebec data found in the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) of 2005. In eect, obtaining the equilibrium reveals the price of health care according to the data, which in our case corresponds to the unknown parameter γ. This approach also provides the taxation and wage parameters consistent with Quebec's GDP and total health care cost for that year. Lastly, since the CCHS data is consistent with Quebec's population, we are able to choose the health law of motion's parameters in order to replicate three observed mortality measures as closely as possible. The current section covers these methodological steps and describes our nal calibration.
Health Care Supply and Equilibrium
Obtaining a market equilibrium requires two additional conceptual steps. First, the aggregate demand for health care is a function of the choices to use the system made by all the population's N individuals, and their level of health, as follows:
The public supply of health care is dened as:
Pensions, like health care, are nanced through income taxes. The health care supply described above is determined only by the government's health care spending, which is equal to the taxes collected minus the cost of public pensions. The rationale behind this formulation is that higher taxes collected for health care should yield a higher quantity of care supplied at an aggregate level.
This formulation implies that health care is produced linearly by the public system and presents no xed cost. This specication deliberately excludes parameters that play an important role in the 7 Thus, we impose a coherence between the funds collected by taxing the distribution's output and the government's expenses. Of course, agents may simultaneously use their savings to supplement the basic public pensions.
capacity of a system to supply care, such as the number of hospitals, beds or physicians. While we are conscious that the supply of health care at an aggregate level is a complex phenomenon, 8 we believe (13) is sucient for the study of health care demand, the purpose of our paper.
In this setting, the aggregate equilibrium is obtained when, for a given tax rate τ and distribution of agents, the congestion level γ is such that HC D = HC S . We denote γ * the congestion level such that the aggregate demand equals the supply of care. As seen in section 2, the congestion parameter directly restrains health care use through the utility cost in the current period and thus lowers HC D . On the other hand, congestion aects HC S through two diverging channels. First, congestion discourages health care use. Agents who decide not to use health care have more available time during the period to work, which generates more tax revenue. Second, congestion can also lower HC S , since patients who are not discouraged spend more time waiting in line and have less time available to work, which yields less tax revenue. For plausible functional forms and parameters, the marginal impact of congestion is stronger on the demand than on the supply, which enables us to obtain a unique numerical equilibrium.
Functional Forms
In total, four functional forms need to be specied to solve our problem numerically: three at the consumer demand level and one at the aggregate level. First, we specify the utility function as:
This utility function is standard in modern macroeconomic models because of two useful properties.
It has a constant Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coecient of ρ and a constant elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.
Second, the time lost at a given period is specied in order to respect the criteria discussed in section 2:
This function is decreasing in health, which means that the sicker the agent, the less time is available 8 For instance, in the case of Quebec, the dierent professionals involved in the deliverance of care are all represented by separate unions with long term contracts, restricting the impact of policymakers on the nal supply of care. The specic care given to a patient is determined by an independent institution, the Collège des médecins du Quebec, which also xes the criteria that determines who can work as a physician in the province. Also, the aggregate cost of health care is often greater than the resources that were budgeted for a given year, yielding decits.
to be spent for leisure or work. When using the health care system, the agent sacrices an amount of time, increasing in γ, in waiting lines, and thus always obtains a higher lost time when α = 1.
Finally, as observed in the Quebec system, patients with severe health problems are prioritized, which means that the waiting time portion of LT increases with health. The congestion level is allowed to assume values between zero and one and can be interpreted in this formulation as the proportion of the period spent in waiting lines by an agent with full health. A Third, the health law of motion, which is a function of current health and age of the agent, as well as both shocks, is chosen as follows:
where a and a are the minimum and maximum ages considered in the calibration and H is the The second term, the production of health care, has similar features. We assume that agents in bad health -for whom H − H is high -can expect a higher gain from using health care. However,
for neutral values of the stochastic term ψ , the agent may not expect to regain full health for values of parameter b 2 above unity. Also, parameters b 1 and b 3 enable non-linearity in the depreciation and production of health. In eect, these parameters and the distribution of the stochastic terms are tools that make this law of motion exible, which we will later use to replicate essential aspects of our data regarding health.
The only function that remains to be specied is the aggregate demand, which is needed to obtain market equilibrium and isolate the congestion parameter γ. We formulate it as a simple linear transformation of the sum of users, weighted by the severity of their sickness:
where α i is the optimal choice of α for agent i resulting from the solution of our demand model. It is noteworthy that this form implies that the cost of treating a given patient is linearly increasing in his sickness level H − H i . The only parameter of this function, d, is the marginal cost, in dollars, of treating sickness. It enables us to equate the demand to the supply, already specied by (13).
Data
The bulk of the data used for our calibration is extracted from cycle 3. 
Parametric Choices and Calibration
In order to calibrate our model, we x a minimal number of parameters according to the existing literature, data and intuition. First, we x ω = .67, a value eective to replicate aggregate choices of working time (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Hansen and Imrohoro §lu, 1992) . Second, in opposition to most macroeconomic applications using this function, we limit ourselves to values of ρ < 1, in order for the value of death described by equation (5) to be realistic. With ρ ≥ 1, this function yields u (0, 0) = −∞, resulting in minus-innite values of death for the agent, rendering their choices at any period irrelevant. By xing ρ ∈ (0, 1), we nd V = −1 /(1−ρ)(1−β). We conducted a thorough sensitivity analysis of the risk aversion parameter, presented in Appendix F, which led us to reject values close to unity, which would lead to waiting times of over half the period for healthy agents.
For all other values within the tested range, we found very similar quantitative results. Ultimately, we set ρ to the middle of the possible range, 0.5, which results in an equilibrium value of congestion of 0.067. With regards to (15) , this value means that agents in perfect health, who wait the longest for care, lose 6.7% of the period in queues before receiving care. At the opposite of the spectrum, agents with the lowest health level only lose 0.6% of the period in lines, as their treatment is prioritized.
The minimum age we consider is the majority age, after which agents are assumed to be in charge of their health related decisions. In practice, we do not impose a maximal age. When agents reach any age over the parameter a = 99, they simply have the same health expectations for a + 1
as agents of that age, which does not impose an automatic death. According to the nal calibration of our model, 18 year-olds in perfect health have a 0.70% chance of reaching ages above 99. The health capital vector is set according to the intuition that full health is represented by unity, and the health of death is set above zero to enable our health depreciation function to reach H for reasonable combinations of age and δ . We also choose a value of H such that LT is strictly positive and below P . This prevents undesirable outcomes as, for instance, agents using health care because the induced waiting time of doing so is nil, their lost time being already equal to the period. Finally, we allow for 15 shocks of both stochastic vectors, in order for agents to obtain varied health outcomes. 9 The retirement and macroeconomic parameters are drawn from multiple sources, as follows. We 
The remaining parameters are obtained through our calibration algorithm in order to replicate the percentage of users found in the database, several demographic facets, the total cost of health care and the GDP of Quebec. This procedure is explained in Appendix D. The full calibration is presented in Table 2 .
9 The specic values of these parameters are of little importance. Other reasonable sets of parameters were found to lead to qualitatively identical results after the execution of our calibration algorithm. 
Determinants of Health Care Demand
The demand for health care resulting from our procedure is an optimal choice of α for every combination of health, age and savings. For a given health level, we nd that older agents always display a positive net gain of using care, resulting a smooth age threshold determining health care use. Figure   1 presents this optimal threshold for all health capital values . All agents below the line, which are both young and in good health, optimally choose α = 0. All agents on the line or above it choose α = 1. This demand ts the trends observed in Table 1 , in which we saw that health care use was stronger in older and unhealthy individuals in Quebec in 2005. 10 To assess how savings aect health care consumption in a public system, we computed the threshold for the lowest and highest savings levels included in our calibration. We found that they were perfectly indissociable: the youngest age for which agents use care is exactly the same for the poorest and wealthiest agents. This result suggests that public health care systems are ecient in being equally available to the poor and the rich. While intuitive, this result has several obvious caveats. In our model, wealth diers only through savings and health status, while productivity in good health is supposed to be homogeneous and unemployment nonexistent. Also, most workers are not self-employed and many of them benet from a form of income insurance against the use of health care in the form of sick days. Thus, we may incorrectly estimate the dierence in usage between the wealthiest and poorest agents. 10 What our model fails to predict is the occurrence of young, healthy respondents choosing to use care despite long waiting times, and vice versa, both of which are intriguingly present in the data. This may occur for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, the distribution's health level is computed from self-declared variables and may lack consistency between dierent respondents. For instance, some respondents may report feeling in good health while being aicted by chronic diseases that require continuous care. Similarly, agents may have used health care to respond to a temporary decrease of health level that is untraceable in the data, since we only observe the self-reported health at the end of the period and its yearly variation. That being said, the most important factor behind this discrepancy is plausibly that the real decision framework used by agents is more complex than the one developed in this paper
and cannot be replicated perfectly. To that eect, we compute the demand for health care resulting from our calibration when for dierent values of γ, keeping the rest of the calibration presented in table 2 intact. In the neighborhood of current congestion γ * , the elasticity of demand is -0.195, indicating that a 1% exogenous increase in Quebec waiting times would result in only 0.2% less users of care.
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Figure 3.2 presents the average prole of health care users for the same congestion values. As the congestion level rises, young agents and healthy agents are less present in the health care system, raising the average age and reducing the average health of patients. This second eect means an increase in the average cost per user, and implies that the elasticity of the costs of care is even lower than the elasticity of demand. In addition to constituting a weak device to ration health care demand and costs, these two results suggest that congestion may induce poor early detection of 12 We nd this elasticity by simulating the demand resulting from γ values at the proximity of γ * :
diseases in young agents, which may have an intricate dynamic impact on both social welfare and public costs as these wait to grow older and more ill before seeking care. While the elasticity we nd is low, it is twice the global elasticity found by Martin and Smith.
We believe this arises because, as noted earlier, the congestion of the system as a whole aects the utility of agents in a more direct fashion than waiting lists for specic elective surgeries. Another possible explanation for the larger value we obtain is the absence of a fully specied job market in our model. Since many workers are insured against income losses through a number of sick days, it is possible that we overestimate the impact of congestion on demand. That being said, we also nd that the demand for care is inelastic, which leads us to conclude that reforms aiming at increasing the system's capacity will be ecient at reducing congestion even in the absence of productivity gains.
Predicted Impact of Policies
In Table 3 , we present the results of four types of policies that impact the global outcome of the public care system: introducing moderating health care fees and modifying the income tax rate, age of retirement, and pension generosity. We simulate these policies by modifying the corresponding parameters in our model and iterating on γ until a new equilibrium is obtained. Included in these results are the expected impacts on usage, congestion, GDP and health care costs, as well as four welfare measures. These are the mean, median and minimum value, which are informative in an ordinal manner, as well as the consumption adjustment necessary to obtain the same average value as the base case. 13 We also exploit the heterogeneity present in our model by presenting how dierent policies aect the use of care and values of agents of dierent ages and health levels.
14 It should be noted that, as is generally the case in this type of analysis, from a given initial state, convergence to the equilibrium by applying the given policies is uncertain, since the distribution dynamics are ignored. Even if convergence was certain, the length of the process could be long.
This may be especially important considering that increases of revenues for health care are implicitly assumed to be directly converted into new services in our model.
This adjustment is obtained by nding the factor k such that
where ĉt,Lt is the optimal consumption and leisure choices made by agents at the equilibrium consistent with the policy scenario, with k = 1. We keep these choices xed, then iterate on k until obtaining an equality.
14 We did not present results per level of savings because they were allocated by us according to the age and health of agents and are thus correlated with those (see Appendix C).
A. Introduction of user fees
Policies 1 to 3 consider the implementation of user fees. We model these as a simple modication of the consumption constraint when agents choose to use health care:
In Quebec's public health care debate, moderating fees have been described by its proponents as a mean to control the use of health care without relying on waiting lines, but its opponents raised concern that they may prevent poorer citizens from obtaining care. Accordingly, we might expect user fees to decrease congestion through a decreased health care usage and increased revenues available for health care. What we observe, however, is that the lowered congestion is so signicant that the percentage of users increases despite the fee for all fee levels considered. Even the imposition of a $100 fee per use, which would account for less than 2% of health care costs, would result in a 45% decline in congestion. We also observe a simultaneous increase in GDP, caused jointly by the decreased congestion -users of health care have more available time for work during the periodand by a response of health care users to the fee in order to maintain their consumption and savings levels. In all three cases, this policy yields increases in GDP and health care use, and a reduction of congestion.
Interestingly, we also nd an increase in social value as measured by all welfare measures when fees are low, meaning that the benet resulting from a reduction in congestion socially outweighs the fees paid by the individuals. However, as the fee increases, this policy cannot is not Pareto optimal, since the minimal value in the distribution lowers. Poor and unhealthy agents prefer being in a system with long waiting lines than paying high fees. Despite this, the health care use and average value of all age and health groups increase even when high fees are charged, suggesting a strong willingness to pay for care with lower waiting lines by almost all agents. Furthermore, according to all welfare measures minus the minimum value, the fee that would lead to the largest social gain is the largest one, which would reduce congestion by almost 90%. We must again remind the reader that our model has no unemployment and that socioeconomic status diers only through the level of savings, since agents have the same wages. Whether these large expected social gains would remain without these assumptions is uncertain.
A more common policy to increase funding for public health care is to increase taxes. Policies 4 and 5 show the predicted impact of increasing the income tax rate τ . As we observed with the introduction of fees, these policies are eective in reducing the congestion of care, and the number of patients increases in reaction to the reduced waiting times. A notable dierence from policies 2 and 3 is that the minimum value of our distribution of agents now increases as the policy intensies. In this policy scenario, poor and sick agents are no longer charged high fees for care and only experience the benets from the reduced congestion. Thus, if fees were to be implemented, taking the capacity of payers into account appears socially desirable. Finally, we note that the number of users and health care costs are drastically higher with a tax increase of 2.5% than with fees of $1000, despite achieving a similar congestion reduction. This constitutes the biggest contrast between the results of the two policies and conrms that fees for care do act as a rationing mechanism. Otherwise, the welfare results of policies 4 and 5 indicate that raising taxes is a viable option, as long as the end result is an eective reduction in congestion.
Policy 6 is equivalent to a government deliberately allowing congestion to rise in order to lower the cost of health care, which funds a tax cut of 1% of GDP. As predicted in the last section, such a policy induces very high welfare costs, as equilibrium congestion more than doubles and the percent of users decreases by 26%. All four measures of welfare also display a noticeable reduction compared with the base case, and agents would require a 12% increase of their consumption to be indierent to the base case. As expected, the percentages of users in younger and healthier agents show the largest declines, and the older agents, who remain heavily in the health care system, show the largest declines of their average value.
In Table F1 .iii, presented in appendix, we test the sensitivity of policies 4 and 6 to six dierent consumer aversion values. We nd these policy results to be qualitatively robust, as only the amplitude of the eects is aected by diering values of ρ.
C.-D. Changes in age of retirement and pension generosity Policies 7 to 11 study the impact of modifying the pension system without modifying the income tax. Thus, if pension costs decrease (increase), funding that was previously directed to retirees is directed to (removed from) the health care system. These simulations are conducted in part as an attempt to determine whether pension generosity or health care should be prioritized when public funds are limited. Also, it has been suggested in Quebec's public spending debate that the longevity of users could be perceived as an opportunity to increase the retirement age and thus generate more production in the economy as a whole, reduce pensions costs and increase public funds (Castonguay and Laberge, 2010). Policies 7 and 8, which increase retirement age to 67 and 70 years old, are conducted in this spirit, and largely support this claim. Such policies would have the highest positive impact on aggregate production and would prove benecial for all our welfare measures. A somewhat surprising result is that both agents of 65 to 79 and 80+ see an important increase of their average values. This arises because agents are able to work and accumulate savings for ve more years, and are able to consume more per period during the rest of their lifetime.
Interestingly, reducing pension generosity without changing the retirement age, as simulated in policy 10, yields a much lower GDP increase than encouraging the elderly to remain in the work force. This policy forces agents to work and save more during their working ages, which further discourages the use of care by young agents. This eect can be best seen when comparing savings and the use of care by younger groups between policies 7 and 10, which otherwise yield a close level of congestion.
Policies 9 and 11 are a complement of policy 6, which allowed congestion to increase in order to fund a tax cut. Instead, these policies explore the outcome of using the reduced costs of care to fund other public programs -in this case allowing for more generous pension programs. Not surprisingly, policy 9, which allows agents to retire at 60 with full pension at the expense of the public care system, yields an explosion in health care congestion, since the funding for care is also aected by a decline in GDP as the workforce is reduced. This policy results in the worse welfare losses of our policy attempts, which is a corollary of Castonguay and Laberge's claim that an increase in retirement age would be socially desirable in Quebec. A 10% increase in pension generosity, as studied in policy 11, is less damaging than lowering the retirement age, but also induces an important congestion increase and a social loss as measured by all but one welfare measures. Only the minimal value measure shows an increase, spurred by the additional pension revenue.
E. Combination of policies
While their results indicate large welfare gains, the political feasibility of reforms 3, 5 and 8 seem weak at best, given their austere nature. However, policy 12 indicates that a similar outcome in terms of additional nancing of care, congestion reduction and welfare gains can be obtained by combining fees of $250, an increase of 0.75% of the tax rate and an increase of two years to the age of pension eligibility. This policy also presents several appealing facets of its own: a higher GDP than policies 3 and 5 because of the increased age of retirement; a lower percentage of users than in policy 5 because of the inclusion of user fees; and a reduced need to increase the age of pension than in policy 8 because of the use of two other nancing levers. As the application of each approach is more modest, such a policy may be more politically viable.
Summary
To summarize, we nd that reducing the funding to a public health care system that displays congestion leads to signicant welfare losses, since it causes waiting times to increase dramatically.
Our results also suggest that Quebec's prevailing situation is far from socially optimal, as all policies aimed at increasing the funding for care and decreasing congestion produce important welfare gains.
For instance, agents would be willing to sacrice up to 8.3% of the ow of their consumption to be in a system where the tax-to-GDP ratio is 2.5% higher but the waiting times for care are reduced by 90%. While many of the policies that increase health care funding are austere in nature and may be politically infeasible, a combination of several more modest approaches would lead to similar welfare gains and waiting times reduction. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we build a dynamic stochastic model to study the demand for public health care in systems characterized by zero monetary prices and waiting times. Our theoretical results show that agents choose to seek care in such a system when the expected gain of doing so, which depends on their health movement expectations, outweighs the option cost of spending time in congested health care facilities rather than working or participating in leisure activities.
Our numerical results illustrate the perverse nature of health care congestion. On the one hand, users of health care spend a large amount of time waiting in queues for care, lowering both their individual utility during the period and the global production of the economy and public nances.
On the other hand, younger and healthier agents are the most discouraged by the utility cost of waiting times, which suggest profound negative implications on the early detection and prevention of diseases and future public health. By simulating how our model reacts to a variety of congestion levels, we nd that the demand for care is quite inelastic. In the case of Quebec, a 1% increase in waiting times would reduce the demand by only 0.19%. Thus, simulations of attempting to reduce of health care costs by increasing waiting times led to strong overall negative welfare impacts. On the bright side, a low elasticity means that congestion can be decreased successfully without important health care costs increases.
Our policy simulations reveal that, in the case of Quebec, a 1% increase of the global tax rate, a $500 yearly fee for users of care or an increase of the retirement age to 67 years old would be sucient to eliminate over half of current congestion, assuming that the increased public income could be transferred linearly into health care production. While such reforms would surely present important political obstacles to implementation in most countries aicted with long waiting times, our simulations indicate that the social value would be improved if a permanent decrease in waiting times was realized.
In our view, this paper should be considered a rst attempt at using computational methods to gain a better understanding of public health care systems. We note that further work needs to be done to expand on our ndings. Because our focus is on the demand for care, we assume that supplementary funding can be translated into additional care without the need for long term investments, training more skilled personnel or any form of decreasing marginal productivity of care. Further research is needed to assess more precisely how health care capacity can or should be increased when more nancial resources are introduced in the health care system. Also, we recognize that our analysis presents a very unconstrained modeling of labor: in order to focus our attention on age, health and savings, we assume that agents are homogeneous in productivity and can freely choose the precise amount of time to invest in their working activity. Adding unemployment and heterogeneity in wages could have a major impact on policy outcomes, possibly diminishing the social desirability of reforms aimed at reducing congestion. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the dynamics of the distribution in the years following the application of policies and their eventual impact on long term equilibrium need to be assessed. This will prove particularly helpful in evaluating the practical desirability of policies -notably in societies with aging populations.
In the future, another important question that should be addressed is the desirability of a dual public-private system in replacement of a public system showing congestion of care, and the optimal size that should be allowed for the private sector. This question arises naturally as congestion and costs force many OECD public systems to consider partial privatization, and access to care concerns in the United States is answered by reforms increasing the public involvement in health care. From a public system presenting long waiting queues, our results suggest that a dual system could show a massive transition of users to private care, since 72% of our distribution of agents seek health care even in the presence of $1000 annual fees when congestion is reduced. We conclude by emphasizing the relevance of numerical approaches to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms at work behind complex problems such as those addressed in this paper. 
Wait

A Analytic Developments
In this appendix, we explore the theoretical determinants of health care consumption in a public health care system by analyzing both sides of inequality (10) in further detail. First, we take a closer look at the expected dynamic gain of health care. In the following developments, in order for both shocks to aect the agent's future health positively, we will assume that δ (a, δ ) is decreasing in δ , while ψ (H, ψ ) is increasing in ψ . Denoting f ( δ ) the density function and F ( δ ) the cumulative density function of the stochastic shock on the health care depreciation rate, δ , the expected value when not using care is as follows:
For a given H, we can obtain a critical value δ such that H ·(1 − δ (a, δ )) = H. By construction, any realization of δ equal to or below that value results in death and a V value for the agent in the next period. By dierentiating, it is easy to show that δ is an implicit function of age and health, increasing in the former and decreasing in the latter. Intuitively, the older and sicker the agent, the more plausible is his death at the end of the period. Using this term, we can rewrite (20) as the probability of being alive in t + 1 times the expected value conditional to being alive plus the probability of dying times V :
With some further work, we can express the expected value when α = 1 in a similar fashion.
Since the agent is now aected by two stochastic shocks, one on his health depreciation and the second on the success of health care, we cannot nd a single critical value of ψ such that H = H.
Instead, ψ is a continuum of critical values with respect to the realization of the rst shock, δ ,
decreasing in δ and increasing in age, while the impact of H can be either positive or negative, as discussed in the previous section. Figure A1 graphically summarizes the concepts just developed.
The probability of living in the next period is the probability of picking a couple ( δ , ψ ) above the function ψ ( δ ).ˆ ψ is the shock on health care production such that the impact of care is exactly zero and only δ aects health, i.e. ψ (H,ˆ ψ ) = 0. If the agent does not use health care or, equivalently, uses health care but obtains shockˆ ψ , the probability of being alive is simply the probability of picking a depreciation shock above δ .
Figure A1: Life and Death According to Stochastic Realizations
Denoting the density and cumulative density functions of health care production shock g ( ψ )
and G ( ψ ) , respectively, we nd the following expected value when using health care:
Unsurprisingly, we nd once again that the expected value is determined by the probability of dying, the expected value in the next period conditional to being alive, and the value of death. It is by combining (21) and (22) that we can decompose the expected dynamic gain in a life-saving and a quality of life components, as discussed in the last paragraph of section 2. As should be clear by now, for a given combination of health and age, both components of the dynamic gain of health care are determined by the distributions of health shocks, f ( δ ) and g ( δ ), whose joint distribution result in a t + 1 health distribution. Denoting this distribution j (H α ), we present in Figure A2 a graphical analysis of three scenarios. The rst two present a situation in which one of the component of dynamic gain is positive and the other is negative. In Figure A2 .i, health care induces a lower probability of being alive in t + 1, but a higher expected level of health in the case of survival. For instance, a delicate attempt to remove a tumor might yield such a distribution of future health. Figure A2 .ii, on the other hand, presents a case in which treatment increases the agent's probability of being alive in the next period, but lowers his expected quality of life. This could be observed in the case of the amputation of an infected limb, for instance. Figure A2 .iii presents an interesting special case, in which all realizations of ψ are superior toˆ ψ , meaning that the impact of health care usage is strictly positive. Conditional only on the value function being increasing in H, we can show that this situation ensures a positive expected gain of health care. In the absence of this extreme scenario, for a given patient-treatment combination, we must attempt to estimate both of the components of gain to ensure a positive expected impact of health care. In particular, the increase of the expected health level of a patient is insucient to ensure a gain. These observations are largely in agreement with the seminal article by Arrow (1963) , which emphasizes the importance of uncertainty on individual health care consumption choices. In summary, the left-hand side of (10) is mainly determined by the variables aecting the agent's future health. These variables are the depreciation function δ (a, δ ) , the health production function ψ (H, ψ ), the agent's age via its impact on the depreciation of health, the agent's level of health in the current period and the distribution of health shocks, f ( δ ) and g ( ψ ). We also note that the important factor in the agent's decision is not the real distribution j (H α ), but the perceived one, a theoretical justication of advertisement campaigns informing the population of new treatments and recommending early detection of diseases. This also suggests that public policies would have little success restraining the use of health care through this side of the inequality, unless governments deliberately lessened the perceived quality of care by replacing procedures by less eective ones, an improbable strategy. Of course, other variables, such as τ and γ, also impact the dynamic gain through the expected values in t + 1, but this impact is indirect, since they appear in both V 1 and
We now focus our attention on the right-hand side of (10), the utility sacriced in the current period when choosing α = 1. To keep the following developments as simple as possible and focus on the most pertinent aspects of the model for policy purposes, we will be omitting the savings variable, which means imposing A = A = 0.
15 Under this assumption, the only way to impact the inter-temporal aspect of his problem is through the use of health care. Assuming the agent is of working age, once the choice of α has been made, the remaining choice is limited to how much time the agent spends working, which determines directly, through time constraint (2) and consumption constraint (3), the level of consumption and leisure time. Interestingly, this problem is both static and very simple:
The interior solution to this problem resulting from the rst order condition is the common microeconomic result that the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption and leisure must be equal to the ratio of their prices. For utility functions that present convex indierence curves, the single constraint of (23) is always respected. Now, assuming only that LT (H, αγ) is strictly higher when using health care, it is easy to show using dierentiation that the rst order condition yields both lower consumption and leisure time if α = 1,
This assumption is intuitive in our context, since we are interested in health care systems presenting long waiting times. Unsurprisingly, dierentiation shows that this utility loss is increasing in the accrued lost time incurred by using health care. This is directly relevant for policy purposes, LT being increasing in the congestion of health care. Since the only direct impact of this parameter on the consumer problem is an increase of the cost in utility of seeking care, this result leads us to conclude 15 As will be obvious in Section 4, savings are mainly used by agents as a tool to smooth their consumption over time, to insure against health shocks, and to use for their consumption during retirement. We believe that such results
can be left to numerical analysis.
that allowing the congestion of the system to grow constitutes a plausible mean for governments to restrain health care consumption.
All other things being equal, the second parameter determined by the government, τ , has a much less direct impact on the cost of using care, as it aects the agent's utility in t for both values of α. Also, its impact on the optimal choice of working time depends on the utility function, since income or substitution eects could be dominating. It would thus be necessary to impose additional assumptions on the value function to obtain a clear impact of τ on the utility loss, which we will refrain from doing here. The same applies to the agent's productivity w, the second determinant of real wage in the model. τ and w are expected to have an impact on the use of health care, but also on the general equilibrium of the model, since they also aect the working time and consumption of agents, the economy's global production and the funding of the health care system. Thus, numerical results are more appropriate to inform us about these parameters.
B Data Manipulations
To obtain a distribution of agents compatible with our numerical model, we adapted the CCHS database in several ways. First the age of adult respondents in the dataset is a choice between one of 14 adult age groups, from 18 to 20 to 80 to 101 and over. We use demographic data from the Institut de la Statistique du Québec (ISQ) to establish the proportion of respondents in each age group, then allocate a precise age to the respondents within the age group randomly, thus replicating the age distribution of that year.
Second, as for the health variable, the survey contains two questions useful for our purpose. The rst asks respondents their self-perceived level of health at the moment of the survey, the choices being excellent, very good, good, fair and poor. The result of this question alone is not sucient to calibrate the health of agents, as we wish to know the health level before their health care consumption decision. The second question enables us to ll this gap, as it asks the perception of this year's health in comparison to the last, the choices being much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse and much worse. Using both variables, we infer the health level of the respondents at the beginning of the year, before the health care decision. However, since both variables are expressed in a scale of one to ve, this results in large numbers of respondents spread among few health levels. This made obtaining a value of γ * all but impossible, since either nil or very wide variations in the number of users were then observed when iterating on γ. 
where A and α * are the optimal savings and health care demand choices of agents with prole Q(a, H, A). For each a, we isolate the number of agents whose health level falls below H, and are thus eliminated from the stock of living agents:
We do so until the quantity of living agents falls below a suciently low threshold, that we set to 1 /2·10 8 . This means that we consider the theoretical population extinct when individuals have less than 1 chance in 200 million of falling in any given age-health-saving category the next year.
This procedure achieves two distinct purposes. First, it enables the estimation of the mortality per age group and life expectancy resulting from the model, which are necessary for our calibration algorithm (see step 6 of Appendix D).We calculate the mortality rate for a given age group k as the ratio between the quantity of agents that are predicted to die and the quantity of agents that are predicted to be alive during the ages covered by the age group:
where a k and a k are the lowest and oldest ages included in age group k. Note that agents may be counted as many times as the number of years comprised in the age group, as long as they survive each age. In turn, the life expectancy is computed as follows:
Second, it enables us to predict the amount of savings agents of a given age and health prole should possess, on average, according to the model's predictions. This information is essential to our research because our database contains no information on nancial assets, which is necessary in order to calculate the optimal choices of our distribution and the ensuing macroeconomic outcome.
For a given age-health combination, the expected asset assigned to our distribution is the average asset level saved by agents of that prole:
Whenever an age-health combinations is not experienced in the probability tree but present in the CCHS data, such as very young agents in bad health, we chose the average savings of the closest health level with Q (a, H, A) > 0.
D Calibration Algorithm
We use a recursive approach to calibrate the free parameters of the model. This approach enforces that our calibration replicates the precise number of health care users found in the database, the total cost of health care and GDP of the province, and the mortality rates and health expectancy published by the Institut de la Statistique du Quebec (ISQ). The algorithm we use is as follows:
1. As a starting point, we use an ad hoc calibration.
2. We solve the Bellman equation (6) by iterating on the value function of agents. Since this step is central to our numerical analysis, we describe it in Appendix E. From the solution, we extract the optimal choices of our distribution of agents, which enable us to compute HC D and HC S resulting from the current calibration.
3. We iterate on γ until the predicted total number of users is suciently close to the 53.8% observed in the CCHS data.
, which enforces HC D = HC S . This also ensures that the congestion level found in the previous step is exactly γ * .
5. We observe the GDP and working time of agents and adjust w. The new value to be imple- 6. At this stage, we x the optimal choices of agents and iterate on large quantities of dierent plausible combinations of the health function parameters. We use the probability tree scheme presented in Appendix C to calculate the resulting mortality per age group and life expectancy of a given health function. We then systematically restrict the range of the dierent parameters in order to minimize the following mortality criterion: SSE 0.4
If this criterion is minimized, we believe the health function parameters are eective in approximating the health movements that agents can expect to go through, and thus eective for the purpose of this article. Its rst sub-criterion is the sum of squared errors of mortality rates per age group as compared with mortality data from ISQ. Denoting by k the age groups for which ISQ publishes mortality rates, this sub-criterion can be expressed as
2 . Since mortality is much higher in the older age groups, this component really measures the success of replicating the mortality rates of the elderly. The dynamic choices of agents being based in part on their expectations of being alive in the next period, we nd important to replicate very well the mortality rates of these later age groups, and thus give this sub-criterion a larger value. The weighted mortality component, on the other hand, is the sum of the squared errors of mortality rates per age group divided by the observed mortality rates:
. This weighing ensures that the observed mortality in the younger age groups is also well replicated. While we would expect that a calibration that yields good results for these sub-criteria will also yield a life expectancy close to the one observed in the data, we observed discrepancies of up to 4 years with ISQ estimates when targeting only the rst two sub-criteria. This discrepancy could result from the coarseness of the ISQ mortality age groups, which contain 5 years each. By including the absolute life expectancy error as the third sub-criteria, we are able to ensure a minimal gap. 16 7.
To conrm the quality of the health function parameters isolated in stage 6, we repeat steps 1 to 6 until the health function parameters yield stability in the mortality criterion.
The model's GDP and health care costs obtained with the calibration are 0.04% and 0.07% smaller than those observed in 2005, respectively. The life expectancy error is of 0.05 years, the SSE uM is of 15 155 and the SSE wM is of 8.4, resulting in a mortality criterion of 36.2. As can be seen in Figure D1 , while the mortality rates of our calibrated model replicate the general trend of the data, our rates are somewhat superior for ages 70 to 90 and lower for agents over 90.
16 The reasons why we x the optimal choices at this stage are twofold. First, steps 1 to 5 are extremely calculationheavy and necessitate a prohibitive amount of time at existing calculation speed. It would thus be unfeasible, even with a considerably larger computing power than that in our possession, to directly test thousands of dierent health law of motion parameters, which we are able to do by using this scheme. Second, a feature that proved consistent for a variety of calibrations is that old agents with low health are the most prone to use health care. Diering health functions merely aect the critical health level for which an agent with a given age-savings combination will choose to use health, while globally maintaining this result intact. We discuss this result in section 4.1. What this means for our calibration strategy is that even ad hoc health function parameters generate relatively accurate optimal choices following steps 1 to 5, enabling us to test the health parameters without repeating these steps. 
Replacing our initial ad hoc function with this new one, we repeat steps (29) to (32) until the supremum of the point-by-point distance between two successive value functions is nil. Table F1 presents how the main results of our paper would be aected by adopting dierent ArrowPratt consumer relative risk aversion values. We present the results for 7 alternative values of ρ within the span of possible values∈ (0, 1), keeping all the other calibration parameters of Table 2 intact. The rst sub-table presents the global equilibrium obtained with all parameters, the second presents the elasticity at the proximity of γ * and the third reproduces the results of policies 4 and 6 from section 4.3.
F Relative Risk Aversion Sensitivity Analysis
Throughout table, column 7, with ρ = 0.9, presents the largest dierences with our base results (column 4, in bold characters). With a high risk aversion value, agents are extremely fearful of death and avid consumers of care, which leads to equilibrium waiting times escalating to almost 60% of the period -7 months -for users in good health. This leads to small GDP and funds for care in contrast to the other values of ρ, as users of care wait astronomic times in queues and cannot work as much. Ironically, this reduced funding for care and large waiting times also mean that such a risk aversion leads to less users of care and a higher elasticity of demand at the proximity of γ * . This implausibly high congestion rate and the extreme welfare impacts of policies increasing the tax rate are such that we outright reject this value of risk aversion for the purpose of our paper.
For risk aversion values of 0.1 to 0.9, we note quantitative variations but nd largely similar qualitative results. In Table F1 .ii, the elasticity of demand is small and negative at the proximity of 
